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a b s t r a c t
The present study examined the role of valence in the development of children’s implanted false mem-
ories. Seventy-six 7-year-old children listened to two true and one false narrative. The false narrative was
either neutral (‘‘moving to another classroom”) or emotional negative (‘‘being accused by the teacher for
copying off your neighbor”). In addition, half of the children were presented with their class photograph
while listening to the narratives. During two interviews, children recalled as many details as possible
from the true and false events. Results showed that the negative event elicited more false memories than
the neutral event. The presentation of a true photograph did not promote the development of false
memories.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
There is an abundance of studies showing that it is relatively
easy to elicit false memories, i.e., memories for events that were
never experienced, in both adults and children (e.g., Loftus,
2004). Loftus and Pickrell (1995), for example, demonstrated that
exposing participants to suggestive narratives promotes the devel-
opment of false memories. In their study, adults listened to false
narratives describing how they were lost in a shopping mall in
their childhood. Next, they were instructed to recall everything
they could remember about the event. After two interviews, 25%
of the participants (n = 6) reported details about the never experi-
enced event. More recently, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002)
demonstrated the suggestive power of doctored photographs. In
their study, adults were confronted with false photographs depict-
ing themselves during a hot air balloon ride. Over three interviews,
they were instructed to recall the event as detailed as possible.
Fifty percent (n = 10) of the participants eventually concurred with
the hot air balloon ride. Despite this straightforward ﬁnding, Lind-
say, Hagen, Read, Wade, and Garry (2004) questioned the ecologi-
cal validity of the doctored photograph paradigm. These authors
argued that in real life, people rarely encounter doctored photo-
graphs. They do, however, look occasionally at true photographs.
Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists even use true
photographs to help their clients to remember negative events that
might have happened to them in their childhood (cf. Poole, Lind-
say, Memon, & Bull, 1995). To examine the effects of true photo-
graphs on the development of false memories, Lindsay et al.
(2004) presented half of their adult participants with true class
photographs that served as a memory cue (photograph condition).
All participants were given a false narrative describing that they
put ‘‘slime” (i.e., a brightly colored gelatinous compound used as
a toy) in the teacher’s desk when they were a child. Sixty-six per-
cent of the participants (n = 18) in the photograph condition devel-
oped a false memory for the slime event as compared to 25% of the
participants (n = 5) in the no-photograph condition. Lindsay et al.
argued that three mechanisms might account for these ﬁndings.
First, the presentation of the photograph may have strengthened
the apparent authenticity of the suggestive narrative. Second, the
photographs may have encouraged participants to speculate about
the details of the false event. Third, the photograph might have
triggered memories of perceptual details (e.g., the teacher’s
appearance) which then might have become mixed up with imag-
inative details of the false event.
Like Lindsay et al.’s study, subsequent studies relying on photo-
graphs to elicit false memories in adults and children have focused
exclusively on the innocuous target events (see for an overviewGar-
ry & Gerrie, 2005). Thus, Wade et al. looked at false memories for a
hot air balloon ride, whereas Strange, Sutherland, and Garry (2006)
used ‘‘drinkinga cupof teawithamemberof theBritish royal family”
as one of their target events. Legal cases, however, are often about
negative events. Therefore, the question arises whether negative
events might become the target of false memories as easy as more
neutral events.Moreover, no falsememory studies using truephoto-
graphs have concentrated on negative and neutral target events.
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Also, studying the effect of true photographs onmemories for nega-
tive events is of practical interest, sincemany trauma-oriented ther-
apies use true photographs as a means to discuss mainly emotional
negative events (Poole et al., 1995).
There are only a handful of studies that used the false narrative
paradigm to examine whether the valence of false target events af-
fects the development of false memories. These studies have come
up with mixed ﬁndings. For example, Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, and
Bruck (1994) demonstrated that fewer children assented to a nega-
tive false event (‘‘falling off a tricycle and getting stitches in the leg”)
than to a false positive event (‘‘taking a hot air balloon ride”). On the
other hand, Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) found that adults
whowere exposed to false feedback informationwere equally likely
to develop falsememories for a negative event (‘‘an overnight hospi-
talization”) and a positive event (‘‘a birthday party with pizza and a
clown”). In sum, few studies involving children looked at falsemem-
ories for a more ecologically valid negative event.
The purpose of the present studywas to examine the role that the
valence of target events plays in the development of children’s false
memories.Wehypothesized thatanegative target eventwouldelicit
more falsememories than a neutral one. This expectationwas based
onthe recentﬁndingsbyTalmiandcolleagues (2004,2007) thatneg-
ative emotional information is more highly associated and interre-
lated in memory than neutral information. Moreover, research
suggests that the associative structures that underlie emotional
information may be available earlier than neutral information dur-
ing the development (e.g., Pollack & Kistler, 2002). Therefore, to
the extent that false memories rely heavily on interconnected asso-
ciative structures (for a review, see Gallo, 2006), we expected that a
false narrative about a negative event would elicit more false mem-
ories thana falsenarrativeaboutaneutral event.Ourhypothesis that
a negative target event would evoke more false memories than a
neutral one is also based on the paradoxical negative emotion hypoth-
esis (Porter, Bellhouse, McDougall, ten Brinke, & Wilson, Submitted
for publication; Porter, Taylor, & ten Brinke, Submitted for publica-
tion). According to this hypothesis, negative informationwill bewell
recalled over time, butwill also bemore vulnerable formemory dis-
tortion over time than other information. This counterintuitive pre-
dictioncouldbeexplicated fromanevolutionaryperspective. That is,
although negative events should be well remembered to avoid fu-
ture dangers, it would be of adaptive value to include relevant infor-
mation about negative events from other reliable sources (e.g.,
family, therapists, or researchers). Indeed, recent studies usingmis-
information and implantation paradigms suggest that negative
information increases the susceptibility for falsememory formation
(e.g., Candel, 2006; Nourkova, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004; Porter,
Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). According to
Porter and colleagues (Submitted for publication), the intense (neg-
ative) emotion associated with the negative information does not
protect memory from false memory effects, but actually increases
the likelihood formemorydistortion. A subsidiary aimof thepresent
studywas to explorewhether the presentation of a true photograph
would have an effect on false memory rates. To test this, children
were presented with either a neutral or a negative false narrative
that was either accompanied with a true class photograph or not.
Based on Lindsay et al. (2004), we expected that a true photograph
would promote false memories for both negative and neutral target
events.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Seventy-six second grade children (M = 7.62 years, SD = 0.59;
range 7–9) participated in this study. All children had parental con-
sent and received a small present in return for their participation.
The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the
Faculty of Psychology, Maastricht University.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. True narratives
Children’s ﬁrst grade teachers provided written information
about two moderately unique class events that happened to all
children a year ago. Event descriptions had to contain information
about what the event was, where it took place, and when it took
place. These details were integrated in the true narratives. True
narratives had a length of approximately three sentences. An
example would be ‘‘Your teacher from the ﬁrst grade, miss/mister
(name of the teacher), told me that the entire class had to perform
a musical. This happened in the summer.”
2.2.2. False narratives
Our two target events were selected from a pilot study. In that
study, 54 children (M = 8.93 years, SD = 2.14; range 7–13) rated the
plausibility and valence of 10 class events (e.g., ‘‘seeing the teacher
faint”) on two different 7-point Smiley scales (anchors: = implau-
sible/negative, = plausible/positive) with bigger Smileys indicating
more plausible/more positive events. Speciﬁcally, children were
asked how likely the events were to happen for them (i.e., personal
plausibility; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004) and how
pleasant the events were for them. Children crossed the smiley
face that corresponded to their answers. Based on the valence rat-
ings, we selected two events: a neutral event (i.e., ‘‘moving to an-
other classroom”; M = 4.28, SD = 2.24) and a negative event (i.e.,
‘‘being accused by the teacher for copying off your neighbor”;
M = 1.34, SD = 1.27, t(52) = 9.18, p < .001, 1 missing value). These
events did not differ in terms of plausibility (Mneutral = 6.11,
SD = 1.53, Mnegative = 5.93, SD = 1.78, t(53) < 1, n.s.). Furthermore, a
randomly selected group of 18 children (M = 9.44, SD = 2.12, range
7–13) also had to provide script knowledge about the target
events. That is, they were instructed to report the typical proce-
dures of our target events. Script knowledge was assessed by using
the number of idea units that children reported (Scoboria et al.,
2004). For example, when a child reported that all belongings
should be brought to the other classroom when the whole class
has to move to another classroom, this counted as 1 idea unit.
Script knowledge did not signiﬁcantly differ between the two
events (Mneutral = 3.33, SD = 1.28, Mnegative = 2.83, SD = 1.54,
t(17) = 1.28, n.s.).
The false narratives were complemented with self-relevant de-
tails of the name of the teacher and the grade in which the events
allegedly happened. The following descriptions were used as the
neutral and negative false narrative, respectively: ‘‘Your teacher
from the ﬁrst grade, miss/mister (name of the teacher), told me
that your class suddenly had to move from one classroom to an-
other. You had to take all your belongings with you to the other
classroom” and ‘‘Your teacher from the ﬁrst grade, miss/mister
(name of the teacher), told me that he told you a year ago that
you were copying off your neighbor. This shocked you very much,
because you were not copying at all.” The teachers conﬁrmed that
the children had never experienced these events.
2.2.3. Photographs
Photographs were authentic class photographs from the ﬁrst
grade.
2.3. Design and procedure
The study employed a 2 (photograph: yes vs. no)  2 (valence:
neutral vs. negative) between-subjects design. Children were ran-
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domly assigned to one of the four conditions. They were inter-
viewed individually twice, with one week in between. All inter-
views were audio taped and transcribed. At the beginning of the
ﬁrst interview, children were told that we were interested in what
they could remember of some class events that happened to them
a year ago. During each interview, the two true narratives and the
false narrative were read aloud. The false narrative was always pre-
sented in the third position. The interview procedure was similar
to that used by Lindsay et al. (2004). Children were instructed to
report freely about the events. In the photograph condition, chil-
dren were shown a photocopy of their class photograph when
the narratives were read to them. If the children were not able to
recall an event, they were told that ‘‘many people can’t recall cer-
tain events because they have not thought about them for such a
long time. Please concentrate and try again”. Children who still
did not report any details of the event were involved in guided
imagery and context reinstatement techniques. Speciﬁcally, chil-
dren were told to close their eyes and were taken mentally back
to the scene of the event. Next, they were asked to think about
their feelings, who was with them, and about the time of the year.
In such cases, the order of instructions was ﬁxed. Subsequently,
children were asked once more to recall the event as detailed as
possible. If they were still not able to come up with details, the
next narrative was presented.
At the end of the ﬁrst interview, children were instructed to
think about the events every day and if they could remember any-
thing else at the following interview. In addition, children in the
class photograph condition received a copy of the photograph.
They were instructed to use the photograph as a memory cue when
thinking about the events. Moreover, all children were asked not to
talk with others about the events. Also, parents were instructed not
to discuss the events with their child. Interview 2 was identical to
Interview 1. At the end of the second interview, children were
debriefed.
2.4. Scoring
Responses to the true eventswere only classiﬁed as remembered
if a child correctly recalled at least two of the three (what, where,
when) event details provided by the teacher. Responses to the false
eventswere scored as falsememories if a child stated that it remem-
bered the false events and reported details beyond thosementioned
in the false narrative. Likewise, if a child attempted to recall, but did
not have any memory of the event, its report was classiﬁed as ‘‘no
falsememory”. These criteria were adopted from the guidelines for-
mulated by Strange et al. (2006). Two trained, independent raters
scored all false reports. Inter-rater agreement for Interview 1 and
Interview 2 (j) was .87 and 1.00, respectively.
3. Results
3.1. True events
A total of 152 events had to be recalled. One hundred and
twenty-one events (80%) were remembered at Interview 1, while
at Interview 2, 136 events (89%) were remembered, v2(1) = 25.75,
p < .001, Cramer’s V = .41.
3.2. False events
At Interview 1, 57% (n = 43) of the children developed a false
memory and 23% (n = 10) of these developed a false memory after
having been exposed to guided imagery and context reinstatement
techniques. Of these 43 children, no child rejected the false event
at Interview 2. At interview 2, 74% (n = 56) of the children ‘‘remem-
bered” the false event, v2(1) = 35.37, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .68. Five
percent (n = 3) of these children assented to the false narratives
after confrontation with the guided imagery and context reinstate-
ment techniques. The increase of false memories over time is in
accordance with the previous studies (e.g., Lindsay et al., 2004;
Wade et al., 2002). The following report from Interview 2 is an
example of a negative false memory.
Child: I can remember I was doing math. I was sitting next to a
boy or a girl, I don’t remember. Then I did something, and the
boy said: ‘‘Why are you copying my work?” But I was only grab-
bing my pencil. Then he told the teacher and she said: ‘‘Why did
you cheat?” But I really didn’t.
Interviewer: How did you feel?
Child: I was scared because I thought I would get punished.
Fig. 1 shows the percentage of children developing a false mem-
ory as a function of the valence of false target events and the ab-
sence or presence of photographs.
For data obtained at both interviews, we conducted separate lo-
gistic regression analyses, with valence and photographs as predic-
tor variables and the presence/absence of false memories as
criterion. We found a non-signiﬁcant Valence  Photograph inter-
action at both interviews (Interview 1: B = .62, SE = .99, n.s.; Inter-
view 2: B = .82, SE = 1.15, n.s.). However, there was a signiﬁcant
main effect of valence at both interviews (Interview 1: B = 1.24,
SE = .49, Wald = 6.36, Exp(B) = .29, p < .05; Interview 2: B = 1.14,
SE = .56, Wald = 4.16, Exp(B) = .32, p < .05) with the negative narra-
tive eliciting more false memories than the neutral narrative. The
main effect of photograph was non-signiﬁcant at both interviews
(Interview 1: B = .59, SE = .49, n.s.; Interview 2: B = .29, SE = .54,
n.s.).
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the role of the va-
lence of false target events in the development of children’s false
memories. Our study is the ﬁrst to show that a more ecologically
valid false target event with negative connotations is more likely
to give rise to a false memory than a neutral false target event, a
ﬁnding that has obvious implication for the legal domain (see be-
low). This valence effect is in accordance with the recent research
suggesting that negative information increases the susceptibility
for false memory formation (e.g., Candel, 2006; Nourkova et al.,
2004; Porter et al., 1999; Porter et al., 2003). Moreover, our valence
Fig. 1. Percentage of children who developed false memories at Interviews 1 and 2.
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effect is in agreement with the paradoxical negative emotion
hypothesis which states that negative material will not only be re-
called well over time, but will also be at risk for the development of
false memories (Porter et al., Submitted for publication). Further-
more, we also found that at least in children, the presentation of
a recent photographic cue (i.e., a class photograph from the previ-
ous year) does not enhance the development of false memories.
As demonstrated by Talmi and colleagues (2004, 2007), emo-
tionally negative information and neutral information are orga-
nized differently in memory. That is to say, negative information
is more interrelated than neutral material. As a result, the presen-
tation of negative information – either true or false – might in-
crease the possibility that other negative materials become
activated in memory. This, in turn, could affect the development
of a false memory for a negative event. Thus, in the current exper-
iment, the presentation of the negative false narrative about the
teacher’s accusation of copying off might have activated negative
class events that actually did happen to the children, such as get-
ting punished for being boisterous in the classroom. As a by-prod-
uct of this activation, children might be more willing to believe
that the negative false event has also happened to them and this
may raise the probability that they develop a false memory for
the event. Since neutral information is less interrelated in memory
than negative-emotional information, this ‘‘chain reaction” will not
occur when children are presented with neutral false information.
In terms of fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998), one
could argue that negative narratives produce relatively more
gist memory while neutral narratives produce relatively more
verbatim memories. Indeed, recent research suggests that gist
representations often include valence (e.g., negative/positive
evaluation of an event) and emotions (see for an overview Riv-
ers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008). Given the fact that gist memories are
more stable over time than verbatim memories and given that
false memories are almost always gist-based (Reyna, Holliday,
& Marche, 2002), one predicts that negative narratives more
readily evoke false memories than neutral narratives. This pre-
diction is borne out by the current data.
Our ﬁnding that children are more likely to develop a false
memory for a negative event than for a non-negative event seems
difﬁcult to reconcile with the studies by Ceci et al. (1994) and Hy-
man et al. (1995). These authors reported that a negative event
elicited fewer or a similar number of false memories as compared
with a positive event. However, plausibility of the target events
might account for this pattern of ﬁndings. In our study, negative
and neutral target events were similar in terms of plausibility1.
Ceci et al. and Hyman et al. did not control for this factor and there-
fore it might well be the case that their negative target events were
less plausible than their positive target, producing the overall null ef-
fect of similar levels of false memory. As plausible events are more
likely to give rise to false memories than implausible events (Pezdek,
Finger, & Hodge, 1997; Pezdek & Hodge, 1999; but see Otgaar, Can-
del, Merckelbach, & Wade, in press; Strange et al., 2006), controlling
this factor in the studies on false memories is crucial.
Our ﬁnding also seems to be in contrast with Howe’s (2007)
study in which children falsely recalled more neutral words than
negative words. Howe’s study, however, focused on spontaneous
false memories using word lists whereas the present study focused
on implanted false memories using false narratives. Recently, it has
been debated whether both paradigms have the exact same under-
lying mechanisms (see Pezdek, 2007; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade
et al., 2007). Clearly, this issue warrants further study.
Our false memory rates are higher than those in other false
memory studies (e.g., Strange et al., 2006). Note, however, that
we combined false narratives and true photographs to implant
false memories. Recently, Garry and Wade (2005) found that false
narratives produce higher false memory rates than doctored pho-
tographs. Furthermore, Lindsay et al. (2004) showed that true pho-
tographs evoke higher levels of false memories than studies using
doctored photographs. Therefore, it is likely that our combination
of false narratives and true photographs engendered higher false
memory rates than other false memory studies.
The presentation of a true photograph associated with the false
target event did not promote the development of children’s false
memories. At ﬁrst sight, this null ﬁnding is at odds with Lindsay
et al. (2004) who reported that exposing adult participants to a true
photograph increased their number of false memories. These dis-
crepant ﬁndings might be explained by the children’s heightened
levels of suggestibility. Speciﬁcally, children are more susceptible
to suggestive information than adults (for an overview, see Bruck
& Ceci, 1999), which creates ceiling effects in the case of children
being exposed to an extra memory cue like a photograph. So, even
without being exposed to a true photograph, the number of children
with a falsememory after two interviews in our study (i.e., 71%) dra-
matically exceeded the number of adults with a false memory in
Lindsay et al.’s (2004) study (i.e., 27%). Obviously, many children
were inﬂuenced by the authoritativeness of the suggested false nar-
rative. As a result, the true photograph did not possess an additional
value.
In the legal arena, children are usually interrogated about neg-
ative events (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Although we admit that our neg-
ative target event is a far cry from false memories about childhood
sexual abuse, the current study may help to bridge the gap be-
tween the psychological laboratory and court cases in which such
memories play a crucial role. That is, our study clearly demon-
strates that interrogations characterized by suggestive interview
techniques are catastrophic in that they increase the likelihood
that children come up with ‘‘memories” about ﬁctitious events.
The argument that is sometimes heard in court – i.e., this memory
report must be true because it describes such a horrible event (e.g.,
Ceci & Bruck, 1993) – is, as our data show, on shaky grounds.
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